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Ubi Remedium, Ibi Ius at the WTO
Joel P. Trachtman
Abstract

The WTO law of remedies for violation appears incoherent. States that fail to
comply with their obligations are subject to WTO-authorized retaliation. First, this
retaliation takes the inefficient form of blocked trade by the complaining state. This
remedy is unlikely to be useful to developing countries. Second, the amount of trade
blocked by the violation is often used as the measure of authorized retaliation. This
measure is not necessarily incentive compatible, as it is not necessarily linked to welfare.
Thus, its use may result in inefficient breach, or inefficient compliance, with WTO law.
Third, only states that engage in dispute resolution proceedings are authorized to retaliate,
artificially reducing the possible incentives to comply. Fourth, authorization to retaliate
is granted only prospectively, and there are generally no formal remedies for damages
accruing before adjudication and the passage of permitted time for compliance. This also
artificially reduces incentives to comply. This paper analyzes the rationale for, and
structure of, welfare-based remedies that could form the basis for cash compensation in
WTO law.
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The only universal consequence of a legally binding
promise is that the law makes the promisor pay damages if
the promised event does not come to pass.1
According to conventional wisdom, it is a waste of time
and money for developing countries to invoke the WTO’s
dispute settlement procedure against industrial countries.2
1. Introduction
Developing countries that win a lawsuit at the WTO may find that the remedies
available to them are ineffective or inadequate.3 The latin maxim ubi ius ibi remedium
(“where there is a right, there is a remedy”)4 is appositein converse form: without an
effective remedy, developing countries are denied rights (ubi remedium ibi ius). Today,
1

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 236 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1963)
(1881). While Holmes’ comment must be understood in the context of a particular
perspective within the common law system, and while it seems to be contradicted to
some extent in some civil law systems and indeed, in the international legal system, it is
important to draw attention to the question of the results of non-compliance in any legal
system. On efficient breach in the civil law system, see Aristides Hatzis, Civil Contract
Law and Economic Reasoning: An Unlikely Pair?, working paper dated February, 2005,
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=661661.
2
Robert E. Hudec, The Adequacy of WTO Dispute Settlement Remedies for Developing
Country Complainants, in DEVELOPMENT, TRADE AND THE WTO: A HANDBOOK 81, 81
(Bernard Hoekman et al., eds. 2002). While Hudec concedes that this conventional
wisdom has “a great deal of truth to it,” his paper is devoted to showing the complexity of
the issues involved. Id. See also Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Developing Countries
and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization Dispute
Settlement, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 719 (2003); Gregory Shaffer, How to Make the WTO
Dispute Settlement System Work for Developing Countries: Some Proactive Developing
Country Strategies, ICTSD Resource Paper No. 5, March 2003, available at
http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/ictsd_series/resource_papers/DSU_2003.pdf.
3
In the Bananas case, the WTO arbitrators stated that “Given the difficulties and the
specific circumstances of this case which involves a developing country Member, it could
be that Ecuador may find itself in a situation where it is not realistic or possible for it to
implement the suspension authorized by the DSB for the full amount of the level of
nullification and impairment estimated by us in all of the sectors and/or under all
agreements mentioned above combined.” Decision by the Arbitrators, EC—Regime for
the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas—Recourse to Arbitration by the EC
under Article 22.6 DSU, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU, March 24, 2000, para. 177.
4
Attributed to Lord Holt in Ashby v. White (1703) 2 Ld. Raym. 955. This maxim, of
course, begs the analytical question asked by this paper. In fact, this paper, following
modern legal realism, argues that the right is largely defined by the remedy.
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nearly 40 years since developing countries first proposed monetary compensation for
violations of GATT law,5 it seems appropriate to reconsider the utility and potential
structure of monetary compensation.
Imagine a legal system where the remedy imposed for violation consisted largely
of authorization of the aggrieved party to boycott certain products of the wrongdoer.
This would be a legal system in which the legal rights of the poor could be violated with
relative impunity, as their boycott would often not be as meaningful as that of the
wealthy. Several developing countries have argued that “[t]he economic cost of
withdrawal of concessions in the goods sector would have a greater adverse impact on the
complaining developing country Member than on the defaulting developed country
Member and would only further deepen the imbalance in their trade relations already
seriously injured by the nullification and impairment of benefits.”6 The recent example
of Antigua’s claim against the U.S. in connection with cross-border gambling services is
an example.7 Is there any producer in Antigua that would benefit from protection against
U.S. goods or services?8
This would be a legal system in which there could be little assurance that the
punishment would “fit” the crime in any meaningful terms, and so there would be little
assurance that states would have appropriate (i.e., welfare maximizing) incentives to
comply. In a private law setting in which there might be circumstances where welfare
maximization calls for violation, as in efficient breach of contract or efficient lack of
precaution in tort, remedies that are not calibrated in welfare terms would have no
necessary connection with welfare maximization.

5

For a description of the negotiations, see ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL
SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY, 242-243 (2d ed. 1990).
6
World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement Body, Special Session, Proposals on
DSU by Cuba, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and
Zimbabwe, TN/DS/W/19, 9 October 2002. Bown uses a bargaining model of a trade
dispute to show that when countries are large, a complainant’s ability to affect the terms
of trade will greatly increase its ability to threaten retaliation. Thus, a tariff response by a
large complainant can both increase the complainant’s welfare and decrease the
respondant’s welfare, yielding twice the effect. Chad P. Bown, The Economics of Trade
Disputes, the GATT's Article XXIII, and the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding,
14 ECON. & POL. 283 (2002).
7
Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply
of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS/285/AB/R, circulated April 7, 2005.
8
This is a different, and more appealing, argument than that of scale. The scale
argument—to the effect that small countries should have as much “say” and as much
dispute settlement “clout” as large countries—is a corollary of sovereign equality. As
such, it suffers from the same defects, including its implicit preference of sovereign
equality over individual equality.
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Furthermore, the greatest effect of law comes not from formal litigation, but from
compliance in the shadow of the law.9 Without appropriate remedies, states may not
have appropriate incentives to comply. With remedies that exert too great an influence,
states may have incentives to comply where they should not. After all, WTO law is not
like the international law proscription of genocide or torture: it does not normatively
demand compliance at all costs.10 It seems attractive to allow states the flexibility to
“buy” their way out of at least some kinds of obligations by providing compensation to
other states. Efficient breach is an attractive concept in at least some areas of trade law.11
This is more than a developing country problem. To the extent that WTO
remedies are incoherent, the legal system is incoherent. This paper seeks to advance
discussion of reform of the structure of remedies in WTO law, with a focus on the
concerns of developing countries.12 In a proposal made by 50 members of the Least
9

See Marc Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early
Settlement in GATT/WTO Disputes, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L. J.158 (2000); Robert
Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L. J. 950 (1979).
10
There are those who would argue that the laws against torture should be subject to
exception where the cost of compliance is too great. [Dershowitz]
11
We must recognize that efficient breach may be more attractive to U.S. lawyers than
to lawyers from the civil law tradition. See Aristides Hatzis, Civil Law and Economic
Reasoning: An Unlikely Pair, working paper dated February 6, 2005, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=661661.
12
This literature is now extensive. It includes a number of proposals by states in
connection with current WTO negotiations. These are helpfully listed and summarized at
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/iiel/research/projects/dsureview/synopsis.html. See in
particular the Proposal by the African Group, TN/DS/W/15, September 25, 2002
(proposing “monetary compensation to be continually paid pending and until the
withdrawal of the measures in breach of WTO obligations”). It also includes a number of
proposals by commentators. See, e.g., Kym Anderson, Peculiarities of Retaliation in
WTO Dispute Settlement, 1World Trade Review 123 (2002); Claude Barfield, WTO
Dispute Settlement System in Need of Change, 37 INTERECONOMICS 131 (2002); Marco
Bronckers & Naboth van den Broek, Financial Compensation in the WTO: Improving
the Remedies of WTO Dispute Settlement, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 101 (2005); Chi
Charmody, Remedies and Conformity under the WTO Agreement, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L.
307 (2002); Steve Charnovitz, Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 792
(2001); Patricio Grané, Remedies under WTO Law, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 755 (2001);
Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, WTO Dispute Settlement, Transparency
and Surveillance, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE WTO: A PRO-ACTIVE AGENDA 131
(Bernard Hoekman & Will Martin eds., 2001); Robert L. Howse & Robert W. Staiger,
United States—Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (Original Complaint by the European
Communities)—Recourse to arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the
DSU, WT/DS136/ARB, 24 February 2004: A Legal and Economic Analysis, May 8,
2005; John H. Jackson, Dispute Settlement and the WTO: Emerging Problems, in FROM
GATT TO THE WTO: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM
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Developed Country Group in 2002, these countries proposed “monetary compensation
equal to the loss or injury suffered” commencing from the date of adoption of the illegal
measure. They also proposed that collective retaliation be made available in cases of
complaints by least developed countries.13 This paper articulates some of the rationales
for these proposals.
Some have suggested an understanding of the WTO legal system that does not
allow for states to breach and provide compensation for their breach: a strong rule of
pacta sunt servanda.14 Such a system is comparable to a legal system in which the only
remedy for breach of contract is specific performance: obligors have no option to breach.
Under such a system, potential complainants wield an option to impose inefficiently
costly performance on the potential respondent. And in fact, the formal legal obligation
under WTO law seems to be simply to comply: to withdraw measures that violate WTO
law, regardless of their efficiency. However, we must distinguish between doctrine and
practice, and between authority and power: we must examine the law in action.
Even if the WTO legal system is in theory and text a system of mandatory law,
which is at least contestable, its mandatory nature does not extend to the power of its

67 (2000); Jason Kearns & Steve Charnovitz, Adjudicating Compliance in the WTO: A
Review of DSU Article 21.5, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 331 (2002); Pieter Jan Kuyper, Remedies
and Retaliation in the WTO: Are They Likely to be Effective? The State Perspective and
the Company Perspective, 91 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 282 (1997); Kofi Oteng Kufuor,
From the GATT to the WTO: The Developing Countries and the Reform of the
Procedures for the Settlement of International Trade Disputes, 31 J. W ORLD TRADE 117
(1997); Nikolaos Lavranos, Some Proposals for a Fundamental DSU Reform, 29 LEGAL
ISSUES EUR. INTEGRATION 73 (2002); ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE, CRIMES & PUNISHMENTS?
RETALIATION UNDER THE WTO (2003); Robert M. MacLean, The Urgent Need to Reform
the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Process, 8 INT’L TRADE L. REG. 137, (2002); Petros C.
Mavroidis, Remedies in the WTO Legal System: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 11
EUR. J. INT’L L. 763 (2000); Victor Mosoti, In Our Own Image, Not Theirs: Damages as
an Antidote to the Remedial Deficiencies in the WTO Dispute Settlement Process: A View
from Sub-Saharan Africa, 19 B.U. INT’L L.J. 231 (2001); Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement
and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules are Rules - Toward a More Collective
Approach, 97 AM J. INT’L L. 335 (2001); Timothy M. Reif & M. Florestal, Revenge of
the Push-me, Pull-you: The Implementation Process under the WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding, 32 INT’L LAW. __ (1998); Arvind Subramanian & Jayashree Watal, Can
TRIPS Serve as an Enforcement Mechanism for Developing Countries in the WTO?, 3 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 403 (2000); Alan O. Sykes, The Remedy for Breach of Obligations under
the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Damages or Specific Performance? in NEW
DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JOHN H.
JACKSON 347 (Marco Bronckers & Reinhard Quick eds., 2000).
13
Proposal by the LDC Group, TN/DS/W/17, October 9, 2002.
14
Under Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, “[e]very treaty in
force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
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formal remedies: the “right” is undermined, or is less than may initially be thought, by
virtue of the remedy. Again, without a compelling remedy, there is no effective “right”
to specific performance even if the obligation is simply to comply. This is illustrated by
the cases, such as Hormones, where WTO law, definitively declared, has not met
compliance.
Another alternative that has been recommended allows states to auction the right
to boycott to the highest bidder.15 This alternative may solve the problem that the right to
boycott as a remedy disenfranchises the poor, but it does not necessarily solve the
problem of fit in welfare terms: of welfare maximization.
A third alternative is to make the possibility of compensation for violations more
plausible, by pre-negotiating “contingent liberalization commitments” that would be
implemented by the breaching party in exchange for a breach.16 While this approach
seems also to address the problem of asymmetry of power by providing the possibility of
a real remedy for developing countries, it also does not address the problem of fit in
welfare terms. It has the important advantage of avoiding a welfare-reducing boycott.
While many commentators and states have suggested the possibility of cash
remedies, none have analyzed systematically the problem of calculation and
implementation of cash remedies in the WTO legal system. Bhagwati argues that cash
compensation “would amount to only a small fraction of the value of trade affected if
estimated (as it should be) as the gains from trade lost rather than the total value of lost
trade.”17
This paper briefly describes the existing system of remedies in general
international law in part 2. In part 3, it describes the existing WTO treaty law and
jurisprudence of remedies. In part 4, it analyzes this system utilizing the law and
economics analysis of contract remedies, examining the conditions for efficient breach.
In part 5, it examines the possibility of developing a welfare-based remedy in the WTO
legal system. Part 6 evaluates the arguments for and against a system of cash remedies.
Part 7 concludes.
2. The Existing International Law System of Remedies
In connection with remedies, as in other areas, the WTO legal system is a part of
the international legal system. But this does not mean necessarily that the general
15

Proposal by Mexico, TN/DS/W/23 (November 4, 2002). See the evaluation of this
concept by Kyle Bagwell, Petros C. Mavroidis, & Robert Staiger, The Case for
Auctioning Countermeasures in the WTO, Working Paper dated August 2004, available
at http://www.columbia.edu/~kwb8/auctionation080904.
16
Lawrence, supra note 12.
17
Jagdish Bhagwati, After Seattle: Free Trade and the WTO, 77 INT’L AFF. 15, 28
(2001). Bhagwati continues to suggest that “compensation in turn could be directed to
the industry whose market access has been lost. . . .”
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international legal system forms part of the internal WTO legal system. Rather, under
international law, the WTO legal system is a treaty regime with special characteristics
and rules. One area of specialty is the system of remedies in WTO law.18 This system is
simply different from the system of remedies found in general international law. This
section describes the WTO system of remedies within the general international legal
context.
a. A Taxonomy of Remedies in International Law
Remedies for violation of law or contract serve a number of functions in society.
Remedies may be designed (i) to compel compliance, (ii) to promote compliance, (iii) to
promote efficient compliance while avoiding inefficient compliance, and (iv) to punish
transgressors separately from the effects on compliance.
At general international law, formal legal remedies against states are rarely
punitive.19 It is important to define “punitive” in our context. In this paper, we will
distinguish among four quantitative approaches to remedies: (i) less than proportionate,
(ii) proportionate, (iii) compelling, and (iv) punitive. Proportionate remedies are those
that are equivalent to some measure of damage. Compelling remedies are those set at a
level sufficient to compel compliance. In theory, compelling remedies need not be
greater than proportionate, but they are often used as a step up from proportionate
remedies. Punitive remedies go beyond proportionate, and beyond compelling, to add a
measure of remedy that is designed to punish. The reader will immediately perceive that
it is not clear that any of these measures would necessarily result in efficiency. This
paper explores the conditions of efficiency.

18

See Petros Mavroidis, Remedies in the WTO Legal System: Between a Rock and a
Hard Place, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 763 (2000).
19
See N. Jørgensen, A Reappraisal of Punitive Damages in International Law, 68 BRIT.
Y.B. INT’L L. 247 (1997); S. Wittich, Awe of the Gods and Fear of the Priests: Punitive
Damages in the Law of State Responsibility, 3AUSTRIAN REV. INT’L & EUR. L. 31 (1998).
In the Rules on State Responsibility, for example, “the approach taken to
countermeasures is an instrumental rather than a punitive one. Countermeasures are
measures taken not with a view to the punishment of the state which committed the
internationally wrongful act, but with a view to ensuring that the state ceases the
internationally wrongful act (if it is a continuing act) and provides reparation.
Countermeasures are seen as instrumental to obtaining reparation in the broad sense.”
James Crawford, The Relationship Between Sanctions and Countermeasures, a
contribution to the Colloquium of the Graduate Institute of International Studies
(Geneva) on United Nations Sanctions and International Law (June 1999), available at
http://lcil.law.cam.ac.uk/ILCSR/Statresp.htm. Punishment is separated from the
permissible measures seeking reparation or cessation of violation. See also Case
concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, ICJ Reports 1997 p. 3 at 55 (para. 83).
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At general international law, as reflected in the Rules of State Responsibility,20
the requirement is cessation and reparation. Reparation takes the forms of restitution,
compensation, and satisfaction. General international law fails to distinguish sharply
between restitution and compensation as obligations,21 whereas law and economics
theory does so. In law and economics theory, there is an important distinction between
property rights, which would require restitution, and liability rules, which merely require
compensation.22 Art. 35 of the Rules of State Responsibility provides for restitution only
where it is possible and does not impose a wholly disproportionate burden. Depending
on how the disproportionate burden criterion is applied, this approach may be understood
as a hybridized property-liability rule.
The remedies that may be applied for violation of international law23 may be
described by the following table:
Cessation
Restitution
Compensation
Countermeasures
Punishment

Material Requirement
End violation
Restore status quo
Substitute for
restitution/cessation
Sufficient to induce
compliance
Sufficient to punish

Temporal Application
Prospective (ex nunc)
Retrospective (ex tunc)
Retrospective/prospective
Prospective
Retrospective

There are two analytical components: the measure of damages and the period of time for
which that measure is calculated.
b. Cessation, Lex Specialis, and Countermeasures
Under the Rules on State Responsibility, a primary obligation of a state that
violates its international legal obligations is cessation of the violation.24 However, we
20

State Responsibility: Titles and Texts of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States
for Internationally Wrongful Acts Adopted by the Drafting Committee on Second
Reading, U.N. GAOR Int'l L. Comm'n, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.602/Rev.1 (2001)
[hereinafter Rules of State Responsibility]. For the ILC commentaries on the Rules of
State Responsibility, see generally Text of the Draft Articles with Commentaries Thereto,
in Report of the International Law Commission, Fifty-Third Session, U.N. GAOR, 56th
Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 59-365, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter Commentaries].
21
See, e.g., British Claims in the Spanish Zone of Morocco, UNRIAA, vol. II, p. 615
(1925), Religious Property Expropriated by Portugal, ibid., vol. I, p. 7 (1920); Walter
Fletcher Smith, id., vol. II, p. 913 (1927), at p. 918; Heirs of Lebas de Courmont, id., vol.
XIII, p. 761 (1957), at p. 764.
22
See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090 (1972).
23
We exclude from our analysis the potential remedy of “satisfaction,” as it is an
exceptional and specialized form of reparation.
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should note that obligations require compliance in accordance with their terms.
Therefore, if a state has an obligation that is qualified by an alternative performance—
e.g., refrain from polluting or clean up the pollution—it cannot be said that there is a
strict obligation to refrain from polluting. Similarly, in the WTO context, a safeguards
measure that complies with the conditions specified in Article XIX of GATT must be
understood as authorization not to comply with the prohibitions for which it provides an
exception. Again, it cannot be said that there is a strict obligation to comply with the
prohibitions that are relaxed by Article XIX of GATT.
Similarly, it is possible for states to specify the remedy that will be available for
violation. States are permitted to create lesser or greater remedies than those available at
general international law as described in the Rules on State Responsibility. The Rules
reflect this in Article 55, which specifically authorizes lex specialis arrangements for
responsibility. The Commentary suggests that certain provisions of WTO law relating to
remedies have the character of lex specialis.25
Interestingly, and in contrast to some of the arguments made regarding strict
compliance with WTO law, the International Court of Justice “has generally not made
orders for specific performance or for restitution in the absence of express provision for
this in an agreement between the parties.”26
c. Restitution
As articulated in the Chorzów Factory case,27 restitution is the preferred remedy
at general international law. In the Rules, “restitution” is defined as re- establishing “the
situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed . . . .”28 This may be
achieved by returning territory or property. In many contexts, restitution is impossible.
In the trade context, restitution could apply in some areas. For example, where an illegal
subsidy is paid, it may be that a requirement of disgorgement may be understood as
restitution. On the other hand, even disgorgement may not place injured competitors
back into the position that they would have enjoyed if the subsidy had never been paid.
In many trade contexts, restitution will not be apposite, or will be highly impractical.
Thus, our focus will be on cessation, compensation, and countermeasures.
d. Compensation
Under the Rules on State Responsibility, compensation is a “second-best” form of
reparation for violation of international law. As the ICJ stated in the Chorzów Factory
case, ”[t]he impossibility, on which the Parties are agreed, of restoring the Chorzów
24

Article 30.
Commentary at p. 357.
26
Christine Gray, Types of Remedies in ICJ Cases: Lessons for the WTO, in IMPROVING
WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES 401, 404 (Friedl Weiss, ed. 2000).
27
Factory at Chorzów, Merits, 1928, P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 17, p. 48.
28
Article 35.
25
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factory could therefore have no other effect but that of substituting payment of the value
of the undertaking for restitution.” As we discuss below, the calculation of the value of
the asset taken, or of the performance denied, is complex. In WTO law, “compensation”
is understood to be a voluntary arrangement under Article 22.2 of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding(DSU). This is different from the meaning under the Rules, where
compensation may be understood as the payment of damages—voluntary or not.
e. Countermeasures: Inducing Compliance
According to the structure of the Rules on State Responsibility, countermeasures
are separate from remedies per se. Countermeasures are unilateral measures by the
injured state in response to failure of the injuring state to comply with its obligations to
cease the violation and make reparations for the violation.29 However, countermeasures
have a dual character: they are generally designed to induce compliance, but they may
also provide some compensation to the injured state.30
Under the Rules on State Responsibility, countermeasures are intended to induce
compliance by the target state. The Commentary to the Rules understands WTO law to
exclude the general international law on countermeasures, by virtue of the DSU’s
requirement for authorization of measures “in the nature of countermeasures.”31 Thus, by
requiring authorization prior to the use of countermeasures, the WTO restricts the right of
states that would otherwise exist at general international law.32
f. Punishment
International law does not sanction punitive action by states. Article 49 of the
Rules of State Responsibility requires countermeasures to be “proportionate,” which
seems to exclude punitive countermeasures. Under Article 47 of the Rules, the purpose
of countermeasures is to induce compliance, and does not include punishment. However,
retaliation is fungible in a sense: a measure that is intended to induce compliance may
also be felt to punish.
While punishment of states in many international law settings seems unappealing,
there is a rationalist basis for disproportionately large countermeasures in certain
29

See generally E. ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES: AN ANALYSIS OF
COUNTERMEASURES (1984); O.Y. ELAGAB, THE LEGALITY OF NON-FORCIBLE COUNTERMEASURES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1988).
30
Countermeasures are distinguished from retorsion by virtue of the fact that
countermeasures would be illegal if they were not taken in response to a prior wrongful
act by the target state. Article 49.
31
Commentary to Chapter II, para. 9, p. 328.
32
See Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation
and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 179 (2002)
(arguing that limitation on retaliation was the main purpose of the innovations in the
DSU).
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contexts. This basis is the probability of enforcement. Where the probability of
enforcement is 50%, there is a rationalist argument for doubling the damages in order to
induce compliance. Such doubling might be interpreted as punitive.
g. Reputation and “International Obligation”
Reputation in this context is best understood not as a formal remedy, but as a
parameter that may be valued by states, and may be lost by non-compliance.33
Reputation, broadly understood, is the reason that there might be a right that has real
effects without a formal remedy. The best way to understand reputation is as an informal
remedy, and it may easily be understood in rationalist terms.
Indeed, we might understand reputation as an additional motivation by states to
comply. In this sense, reputation may add an important finger to the scale of compliance.
Reputation may help to explain why we observe widespread compliance with WTO law
despite existing prospective-only remedies that would seem, considered alone, to provide
incentives for breach.34 Of course, states may not care about reputation per se, but are
more likely to care about their ability to induce other states to make concessions in the
future, and to comply with existing concessions. This role of reputation may be
understood bilaterally, as similar to linkage politics in the political science literature,35 or
as similar to multi-sector contact in the industrial organization literature.36 Alternatively,
33

See Andrew Guzman, International Law: A Compliance Based Theory, 90 CAL. L.
REV. 1823 (2002).
34
For analyses of the role of reputation, sometimes referred to in this literature as
“international obligation,” see Shannon K. Mitchell, GATT, Dispute Settlement and
Cooperation: A Note, 9 E CONOMICS AND POLITICS 87 (1997); Dan Kovenock & Marie
Thursby, GATT, Dispute Settlement and Cooperation, 4 ECONOMICS AND POLITICS 151
(1992). While “international obligation” and “reputation” are not necessarily the same
thing, for our purposes, it is acceptable to treat them as such.
35
See ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY 91 (1984); Ernst Haas, Why Collaborate?
Issue Linkage and International Regimes 32 WORLD POLITICS 357 (1980); Michael D.
McGinnis, Issue Linkage and the Evolution of International Cooperation, 30:1 J. CONFL.
RES. 141 (1986); Robert E. Tollison & Andrew D. Willett, An Economic Theory of
Mutually Advantageous Issue Linkage in International Negotiations, 33 INT’L ORG. 425
(1979). McGinnis shows formally that in a prisoner’s dilemma “multisupergame”
players may adopt strategies that create linkages across time and games, providing
opportunities for cooperation where cooperation would not be possible for isolated
games.
36
See, e.g., D.B. Bernheim & M.D. Whinston, Multimarket Contact and Collusive
Behavior, 21 RAND J. ECON. 115 (1990); Corwin Edwards, Conglomerate Bigness as a
Source of Power, in “Business Concentration and Price Policy,” NBER Conference
Report (Princeton University Press 1955); Hitoshi Matsushima, Multimarket Contact,
Imperfect Monitoring and Implicit Collusion, 98 J. ECON. THEORY 158 (2001); Giancarlo
Spagnolo, On Interdependent Supergames: Multimarket Contact, Concavity and
Collusion, 89 J. ECON. THEORY 127 (1999).
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to the extent that information and incentive problems may be overcome, it is possible that
multilateral reputational effects could add a much larger finger to the scale of
compliance.
Under these circumstances, we might understand dispute settlement as providing
a method for discriminating between defection and compliance, in order to provide
information necessary for multilateral reputational sanctions to operate. Milgrom, North
and Weingast argue that third-party dispute settlement can assist in developing
cooperation. Maggi makes this point in the trade context.37 Third-party dispute
settlement can solve the following information problem. If two parties have a dispute, in
which one accuses the other of defection, how can other members of the community
determine whether the accusation is true?38
Reputation may be a powerful force in promoting compliance, and should be
factored into any analysis of remedies. As Kovenock and Thursby, and Mitchell,
conclude, formal WTO remedies that seem inadequate to induce compliance on their own
seem to be supplemented by reputation, or “international obligation,” in order to induce a
high level of compliance.39 While their work does not distinguish sharply among (i)
generalized multilateral retaliation and issue linkage, (ii) concern for general respect for
international legal rules (which may be the same as (i)), and (iii) a preference for a good
reputation, each of these factors may be at work. However, Bown finds “only limited
evidence that the costs imposed by ‘international obligation’ are suff iciently large to”
credibly affect behavior.40
Article 22.8 of the DSU, specifying that suspension of concessions is a temporary
remedy, provides that the WTO Dispute Settlement Body shall continue to keep under
surveillance the implementation of adopted recommendations or rulings. This
surveillance would help to effectuate the role of reputation.
It may be that reputation has different effects in different types of cases. Perhaps
where the violation is clear or flagrant, reputation would have a stronger effect. On the
other hand, where the violation is a matter of interpretation, and there are appealing
arguments on both sides, as in many circumstances where trade liberalization comes into
conflict with other values, including domestic regulation, reputation may play a weaker
role. In the Hormones case, it is not clear whether the EC or the U.S. has paid a greater
price in reputation.

37

Giovanni Maggi, The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade
Cooperation, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 190 (1999).
38
Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, The Role of Institutions
in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges and the Champagne Fairs, 2
ECON. & POL. 1, 8 (1990).
39
Note 34, supra.
40
Chad P. Bown, On the Economic Success of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement, 86 REV.
ECON & STATS 811(2004) .
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h. Public Interest Remedies and Public Choice Remedies
As we consider remedies in the international system, among states, as compared
with remedies in the domestic system, among individuals and firms, we must recognize
that states are imperfect mediators of individual preferences.41 Therefore, a remedy that
appears on its face to be consistent with public interest—with welfare economics—may
not yield efficient incentives in a world of states.
And yet, public choice analysis recognizes that government operatives are often
especially sensitive to the concerns of concentrated or well-organized interest groups.
Therefore, it would not necessarily be inconsistent with public choice analysis to use a
reference to profitability as a measure of damages. Of course, it might be equally
plausible to use references to jobs lost and gained as a measure of damages from a public
choice perspective. But there is no reason to assume that volumes of trade are the sole or
even central governmental preference. Public choice does not require mercantilism.42
Rather, the benefit that would be received by import competing domestic producers or by
domestic exporters is dependent on the prices they would receive. While in certain
circumstances, trade volumes may be congruent with terms of trade,43 there can be no
assurance that volumes of trade are linked with terms of trade effects, or welfare,44 in any
particular case.45 This is especially true for small economies.
The normative goal of positive public choice analysis must be to enhance the
alignment between the behavior of governmental operatives and public welfare. So, there
is no normative argument that remedies in WTO disputes should be designed to
maximize the welfare of governmental operatives. Rather, the normative goal is to
suggest methods in which remedies could be redesigned in order to provide optimal
incentives for welfare maximization. Of course, without great knowledge of the
problems of alignment between governmental operative welfare and public welfare, it is
41

Actually, firms, too, are imperfect mediators of individual interests, as shown by the
study of corporate law over the past 50 years. This raises the question, in connection
with contracts entered into by firms and damages or penalties assessed against firms,
whether a non-welfarist approach to damages would be desirable in order to respond to
the representational defects of the firm.
42
Lawrence points out the mercantilist perspective behind this system. Lawrence, supra
note 12, at 43.
43
KYLE BAGWELL & ROBERT W. STAIGER, THE ECONOMICS OF THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM (2002).
44
See Howse & Staiger, supra note 12 (suggesting that the 1916 Act arbitrators’
interpretation would call for quantification of the welfare effect on the relevant
governments). Howse and Staiger focus on governmental welfare in a public choice
sense, referring to political pressures and dislocation costs.
45
But see Lawrence, supra note 12, at 43, stating that “R
ebalancing also accords with
the ideas of trade theory. By rebalancing, the plaintiff is able to eliminate any
deterioration in its terms of trade that might have resulted from the violation of the
agreement.”
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impossible to be certain that any particular pattern of incentives will result in publicwelfare oriented behavior by government operatives. Thus, under this uncertainty, there
seem to be three possible strategies:
i. Assume that WTO law is already sufficiently aligned with public
welfare to make it worthwhile to seek remedies that compel
compliance; that is, the specific performance remedy. As
discussed below, this amounts to an assumption that the WTO
treaty is a reasonably complete contract. Of course, in the
domestic setting, we recognize that contracts are never this
complete, as it is inefficient to write contracts that address every
possible state of the world. Therefore, in the domestic setting we
use courts to enforce contracts and in most cases of breach to
assess money damages. This domestic contract approach is similar
to the approach described in paragraph (ii) below.
ii. Design a remedy based on public welfare, in the hopes that
remedies that are congruent with public welfare will cause states to
act in a manner congruent with public welfare. Similarly, we
assume in the domestic system that contract remedies aligned with
welfare—calculated in terms of lost welfare benefits—will cause
corporate actors to act in a manner congruent with welfare.46
iii. Design a remedy that is intentionally inconsistent with public
welfare per se, on the ground that due to public choice problems
that cause governments to act inconsistently with public welfarebased incentives, a different calculation of remedies will provide
incentives for states to act in a manner congruent with public
welfare.
We will focus on strategy (ii). Strategy (i) seems inappropriate for at least some
areas of WTO law. Strategy (iii) is a grand complication that imposes a double burden of
determining first what public welfare is and then structuring a remedy that, in light of
public choice, conforms with public welfare. Given the variety of public choice
problems that states in the WTO may have, it seems unlikely that a single public choice
structure could induce public welfare-maximizing behavior. Rather we would expect that
the best way to provide incentives for public welfare maximizing behavior is to design
incentives consistent with such behavior.
Moreover, it seems clear that the present system of remedies in the WTO has no
particular claims to public choice efficiency. There is no reason to believe that
calculation of nullification or impairment in terms of volumes of trade or amountsof
46

While firms may be more transparent than states, the assumption that public welfaredenominated remedies produce public interest maximizing behavior does not seem
significantly more heroic than the similar assumption in the context of firms. Indeed, the
public choice critique is analogous to a critique of the ability of firms to act rationally in
response to incentives.
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subsidies approximates the incentives of governmental operatives better than a welfarist
calculation. In fact, the opposite seems true. Under circumstances of uncertainty as to
the motivations of governmental operatives, it would seem better to assume congruence
with welfare than to make any other assumption. At least we hope that governmental
structures are somewhat accountable to the preferences of citizens in a welfare sense.47
3. Existing WTO Treaty Rules and Jurisprudence of Remedies
The structure of remedies under the WTO treaty exhibits important areas of
continuity with the structure of remedies that developed under GATT from 1947 to
1994.48 The main characteristic of these remedies is twofold: first, cessation by the
respondent of measures that violate WTO law, and second, if the offending measure is
not terminated in a timely manner, suspension by the complaining state of equivalent
concessions.49
i. Cessation
The primary remedy of cessation is itself problematic, as it (i) is not clearly stated
in WTO law, (ii) is by its nature only prospective,50 and (iii) is not necessarily associated
with either justice or efficiency. The limitation of remedies to prospective ones51 seems
to provide perverse incentives for violation. So, a violating state generally has a “free
ride” for the period from the date the illegal measure is made effective until the
expiration of the “reasonable period of time” determined under Article 21.3 of the DSU.
Of course, this reasonable period of time only begins after the Dispute Settlement Body
has adopted the relevant panel or Appellate Body rulings.

47

One further caveat: a welfare calculation performed by a court seems inconsistent
with the principle of consumer sovereignty, as it involves interpersonal comparison of
utility.
48
For an in-depth comparison, see Mavroidis, supra note 18.
49
See ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF
THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM (1993).
50
But see Article 21.5 Panel Report, Australia—Leather, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the
DSU by the U.S. (holding that Article 19.1 of the DSU does not limit remedies under
Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement to purely prospective action). See Gavin Goh &
Andreas Ziegler, Retrospective Remedies in the WTO After Automotive Leather, 6
J. INT’L ECON. L. 545 (2003).
51
There are some exceptions to this limitation, in addition to Australia—Leather.
During the GATT period, antidumping duties and countervailing duties found to be
imposed illegally were often recommended to be reimbursed. See, e.g., United States—
Measures Affecting Imports of Softwood Lumber from Canada, 41 B.I.S.D. 413-15
(1993); United States—Countervailing Duties on Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork from
Canada, 38 B.I.S.D. 30 (1991); New Zealand—Imports of Electrical Transformers from
Finland, 32 B.I.S.D. 55 (1985). This practice was by no means uniform.
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According to an analysis by the Government of Mexico,52 the average period
from the establishment of a panel to the adoption of the final panel or Appellate Body
report in cases involving review under Article 21.5 exceeded 3 years. If we add (i) the
period prior to establishment of a panel, (ii) the “reasonable period of time” made
available to the respondent state, and (iii) the time to obtain authorization to suspend
concessions, this free ride is lengthy indeed.
However, cessation is not necessarily congruent with either justice or efficiency.
For example, in connection with the Hormones case, some may take the view that
compliance by the EU with WTO law would have been inefficient, and an injustice. In
this regard, we mightbegin to distinguish among different rules of WTO law. First,
breach of tariff reduction commitments or other de jure protectionist measures, or
perhaps even some category of clearly protectionist de facto measures, will generally
reduce welfare, and so might be seen as suitable for a specific performance remedy.53
Second, domestic regulation measures that may violate national treatment requirements
or MFN requirements, or requirements under the TBT or SPS Agreement, or similar
requirements under the GATS, may give rise to greater uncertainty regarding welfare,
and thus may be less suitable for a specific performance remedy. Finally, of course, nonviolation nullification or impairment may be even more normatively ambivalent. Under
current law, there is no obligation to withdraw a measure that results in non-violation
nullification or impairment. Export subsidization may be a special case. Export
subsidies can rarely harm consuming states in a welfare sense. They generally harm the
state conferring the export subsidy, and therefore might be expected, under responsive
domestic government, to require no legal remedy. And yet, from a public choice
perspective, and under strategic trade theory, export subsidies can do harm and can result
in pressure on other governments to respond in kind. Therefore, there may be some good
reason based on the irrational behavior of states for the existing prohibition.
Thus, considering the following four broad categories of potential violations of
GATT (or related codes relating to goods), remedies might be approached in the
following ways:
Type of De jure
violation excessive
tariffs

52

De jure
discrimination,
quotas, or
other de jure
“protectionist”
regulation,
without

De facto
discrimination
or other de
facto
“protectionist”
regulation or
de jure

NonViolation
Nullification
or
Impairment

Proposal by Mexico, TN/DS/W/23, November 4, 2002.
Measures of welfare in this context are generally ignorant of distributive
consequences. So it may be that even where the measure should be withdrawn in
accordance with welfare maximization, transaction costs may suggest that it might be
maintained because those who lose as a result of withdrawal will not otherwise be
compensated.

53
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colorable
defense
Remedy

Specific
Specific
performance performance

discrimination
with colorable
defense
Damages

Damages

The point is that for measures that are more likely to be welfare-reducing, a mandatory
remedy, perhaps specific performance, seems appropriate. In other words, in these areas,
we would not be greatly concerned with the potentially resulting bilateral monopoly that
would frustrate negotiations and by default leave the entitlement with the complainant
state, as this would result in the efficient outcome of cessation. In other areas in which
mandatory remedies might be more likely to result in inefficient compliance, a more
subtle damages mechanism may be required.
ii. Compensation
Where cessation does not occur, the parties may negotiate “compensation”, which
is voluntary, under Article 22.2 of the DSU. This voluntary remedy, used only once
since the establishment of the WTO,54 is not generally understood to contemplate
financial compensation. Rather, compensation is understood to be trade-flow based—the
expectation is that the losing respondent provides greater liberalization. However,
instead of suspension of concessions, this concept involves grant by the respondent of
substitute concessions.55 One explanation for the infrequent use of this facility may be
that any compensatory concession would be required to be provided on an MFN basis,56
whereas suspension of concessions under Article 22.6 is only authorized for the
complaining state, and thus is not provided on an MFN basis.
iii. Suspension of Concessions
Where neither withdrawal of the offending measure nor voluntary compensation
occurs, any party that invoked the dispute settlement procedures may request
authorization to suspend the application to the respondent of concessions or other
obligations under the covered agreements. The suspension of concessions is not
automatically available to all injured states.
Under Article 22.4 of the DSU, “The level of the suspension of concessions or
other obligations authorized by the DSB shall be equivalent to the level of the

54

Japan—Alcoholic Beverages, Mutually Acceptable Solution on Modalities for
Implementation, WT/DS8/17, January 12, 1998 (providing autonomous tariff reduction).
55
For a proposal to pre-establish the type of compensation that would be granted, see
Lawrence, supra note 12 (proposing pre-negotiated “contingent liberalization
commitments”).
56
It is required to be “consistent with the covered agreements,” which include
obligations of MFN treatment.
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nullification or impairment.” This is the sole guidance provided by the DSU as to the
calculation of remedies.57
It seems strange, and it is not required or even suggested by the text of Article
22.4, that the level of nullification or impairment is considered only prospectively,58
rather than from the commencement of the violation. While all arbitrations considering
the level of nullification or impairment under Article 22.6 have assumed that the
remedies they authorize are limited to prospective nullification or impairment,59 the panel
in Australia-Leather rejected arguments that an arcane reading of Article 19 of the DSU
permitted only remedies that involved prospective action.60
Furthermore, diplomats and other practitioners seem to think of WTO remedies as
intended to implement “rebalancing.” It would be a strange rebalancing that was solely
prospective in its regard. If this were the only parameter to consider, it would be patent
that remedies in the WTO legal system are insufficient to provide incentives to comply.
It is comparable to a law against theft that simply requires the thief to return the stolen
property once caught.
The reference to “the level of the nullification or impairment,” following GATT
“lore,” has generally been taken to mean the volume of blocked trade. However, recall
that withdrawal of concessions was only authorized once in the GATT era (from 1947 to
1994), and in that case, the panel had regard to the value of the trade involved, and
“broader elements in the impairment suffered by the Netherlands.”61 In the WTO era,
arbitrators have sought to equate the value of imports to be blocked by the complaining
57

However, arbitral panels have found that language in the SCM Agreement provides a
special regime for remedies in response to export subsidies. See, e.g., Brazil—Export
Financing Programme for Aircraft, Recourse to Arbitration by Brazil, WT/DS46/ARB,
21 August 2000; United States—Tax Treatment for ‘Foreign Sales Corporations,’
Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article
4.11 of the SCM Agreement—Decision by the Arbitrators, WT/DS108/ARB, 30 August
2002.
58
This appears to have been the “understanding” in the GATT era. See ROBERT E.
HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN
GATT SYSTEM __ (1993). This “understanding” was followed under the WTO, in
Bananas. Report of the Panel, European Communities—Regime for the Importation,
Sale and Distribution of Bananas—Recourse to Article 21.5 by Ecuador,
WT/DS27/RW/ECU, para. 6.105 (April 12, 1999).
59
But see Panel Report, Canada—Aircraft, WT/DS222/R, adopted February 19, 2002.
60
Article 21.5 Panel Report, Australia—Leather, Recourse to Article 21.5 by the United
States. Both the U.S. and Australia argued against the retrospective component of this
decision, and the panel report was severely criticized by some member states. See
Minutes of Meeting, Held in Centre William Rappard on February 11, 2000,
WT/DSB/M/75.
61
Netherlands—Measures of Suspension of Obligations to the United States, BISD
1S/32-33.
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state to the value of the complaining state’s exports blocked by the respondent state’s
WTO-inconsistent measure. In a useful analysis, Spamann shows that arbitrators fail to
achieve even this equivalence, and shows that blocked trade, as opposed to affected trade,
is an artificially limited category.62
iv. Summary
To summarize the WTO system of remedies analytically, we might use the
following approach, focusing initially on incentives to states as “billiard balls.” A second
layer of analysis would examine incentives to firms or other constituencies within the
state.
States would be expected to comply if the global payoff from defection is less
than the value of bilateral prospective suspension of concessions plus multilateral
reputation. Under the present system, as described above, states would be expected to
comply if
pspb + rm > dm
where
spb = the value of bilateral prospective suspension of concessions, multiplied by a
discount rate to reflect the delay between the occurrence of injury and the effectiveness of
the suspension of concessions.
p = the probability of enforcement, where 0<p<1
rm = the value of multilateral reputation effects
dm = the global payoff to defection
We have suggested above that there is some question about the two subscripts of
s: whether suspension of concessions is related only to prospective nullification or
impairment and whether it is merely bilateral. Here, by bilateral, we refer to the last
sentence of Article 22.2 of the DSU, permitting only those member states that have
“invoked the dispute settlement procedures” to “request authorization from the DSB to
62

Holger Spamann, The Myth of ‘Rebalancing’ Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement,
working paper dated January 11, 2005. Spamann analyzes arbitration decisions, finding
that WTO retaliation authorizations are “random.” Specifically, “Article 22.6 decisions
use an underspecified trade effects comparator and asymmetric measurements of
nullification and suspension, respectively. As a result, equivalence of the levels of
nullification and suspension is defined by comparisons of numbers that refer to entirely
different things.” Id. at 2. Jackson has also found that rebalancing is a fallacy. John H.
Jackson, International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports: Obligation to
Comply or Option to ‘Buy Out’, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 109, 121-22 (2004).
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suspend the application to the Member concerned of concessions or other obligations
under the covered agreements.”63 In the next section, we address the question of
valuation of nullification or impairment, and therefore of suspension of concessions.
Many have pointed out that it is unlikely that spb would exceed dm—thatthe value
of bilateral suspension of concessions would exceed global payoffs to defection.
Kovenock and Thursby have suggested that rm must fill the gap, as we observe substantial
compliance. But the compliance that they observe is with rulings themselves after a case
has been brought and concluded. Obviously, the complaining state will always be left
inadequately compensated by spb. Perhaps more saliently, compliance with rulings is not
necessarily enough to address the losses of complainants—the reputational effect that
rulings seem to invoke comes too late. States have a significant period of free-riding. It
may be hypothesized that reputation or international obligation builds up and induces
states to avoid repeat violations in order to avoid a reputation as a “scofflaw.” But
without data supporting this hypothesis, we have the remaining problem of noncompliance: of theft where the only obligation is to give back the stolen property some
time after adjudication. [check new Busch-Reinhardt paper]
Different kinds of violations will entail varying probabilities of enforcement, and
different probabilities of reputational consequences with other states. We have not
reflected the costs of litigation.
Finally, as Guzman points out, at least some portion of what might be understood
to be rm does not accrue to the benefit of the complainant.64 In Guzman’s model, lost
“reputation” is not recovered by anyone. An alternative approach, which understands
reputation as information regarding the suitability of the respondent as a counter-party,
would see a collective action problem in connection with the production of this
information. The point is that the amount of spb that, when added to rm is sufficient to
induce compliance may not be sufficient to compensate the complainant.
States would be expected to comply optimally, and to breach efficiently, where
damages are set to equal the obligees’ expectations: an expectation measure of damages.
Where it is difficult to calculate this measure, and where negotiations between the parties
would be expected to arrive at this measure at lower costs, specific performance may be
preferred.
Below, this paper suggests the following method of calculating damages, resulting
in a measure of damages equal to the value of multilateral injury resulting from the
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This is true of formal sanctions. Obviously, informal sanctions (or at least those
permitted by Article 23 of the DSU) may be multilateral. See Giovanni Maggi, The Role
of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 190
(1999).
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violation, both retrospectively and prospectively, plus interest, and increased by a
multiplier to reflect the uncertainty of enforcement.
1
p

cmt + e = md

where
cmt = the value of multilateral injury caused by the violation, ex tunc (including
both retrospective and prospective components), plus interest from the date of injury
p = the probability of enforcement
e = cost of enforcement
md = measure of damages
On first analysis, it appears that where cmt < dm, states should be encouraged to violate.
Therefore, in these cases, the role of reputation is problematic. Interestingly, where
formal remedies are set right, reputation may impede the achievement of efficiency.65
[Stephan/Scott point that formal competes with informal] On the other hand, reputation
may reflect a wider context in which there is value to compliance even where the
individual act of compliance is inefficient: there may be real value in upholding the
system of promises even if it results in a cost within the narrow case.
Alternatively, it may be that where a state pays the appropriate level of damages,
reputational effects would be diminished to near zero. After all, if the obligee is made
indifferent by the appropriate measure of damages, why would others decline to deal with
the obligor in the future, or impose other “reputational” or informal responses or
penalties? This seems even more correct if we distinguish among WTO law rules as
suggested above. Reputational sanctions might still apply where a state fails to comply
with rules that can be understood as property rights, whereas if a rule is understood as a
liability rule perhaps no reputational sanction would attach.
b. Calculation of Nullification or Impairment and Suspension of Concessions
There have only been eight arbitrations of the magnitude of nullification or
impairment and suspension of concessions under Article 22.6 of the DSU as of the date
of this article, and three of those involved export subsidies under what the arbitrators held
were special rules.
In the export subsidies cases, the arbitrators authorized suspension of concessions
in amounts (a) related to the magnitude of the globalsubsidy, and (b) designed to compel
compliance, based on an incorrect reading of the SCM Agreement. For example, in
65

This may help to explain the move to restrict extra-judicial remedies in Article 23 of
the DSU.
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Brazil—Aircraft, the panel determined that nullification or impairment is not the correct
reference in export subsidies cases. It used as its reference the amount of the subsidy, in
order to enhance the efficacy of countermeasures in the special case of prohibited
subsidies.66 In effect, in the export subsidies cases, the arbitrators crafted a property rule,
and tried to calculate suspension of concessions in order to compel compliance.
The relevant text is Article 22.4 of the DSU, which simply requires that the level
of suspension of concessions or other obligations authorized be “equivalent” to the level
of the nullification or impairment.
During the GATT period, the relevant text, GATT Art. XXIII:2, specified that the
contracting parties could authorize the suspension of “such concessions or other
obligations under [GATT] as they determine to be appropriate in the circumstances.”
Thus, the reference was to “appropriate” concessions, rather than concessions
“equivalent” to the level of nullification or impairment. However, in the 1952
Netherlands case, “the Working Party was instructed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES
to investigate the appropriateness of the measure which the Netherlands Government
proposed to take, having regard to the equivalence to the impairment suffered by the
Netherlands as a result of the United States restrictions.”67 Thus, the distance between
“appropriate” and “equivalent” under GATT may not have been great. Today, we might
interpret “appropriate” in GATT Art. XXIII:2 by reference to the general international
law of state responsibility, as evidenced by the Rules of State Responsibility.
In the context of export subsidies, also, the relevant standard appears to be
“appropriate” pursuant to Article 4.10 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures. This reference could also have been taken as a reference to Article 22.4, but it
has not been. Rather, arbitrators interpreting “appropriate” in the context of Article 4.10
have focused on the context there of illegal export subsidies and have held that remedies
should be designed to compel compliance. Therefore, in the FSC case, they authorized
retaliation by a single member in respect of the amount of global subsidization.
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It appears that “equivalent” is a less complex, less nuanced, comparator than
“appropriate.”68 In the EC—Bananas III (U.S.) case, the arbitrators first sought to define
“equivalence” under Art. 22.4, based on dictionary entries:
We note that the ordinary meaning of the word "equivalence" is "equal in value,
significance or meaning", "having the same effect", "having the same relative
position or function", "corresponding to", "something equal in value or worth",
also "something tantamount or virtually identical". Obviously, this meaning
connotes a correspondence, identity or balance between two related levels, i.e.
between the level of the concessions to be suspended, on the one hand, and the
level of the nullification or impairment, on the other.69
This passage contains a number of ideas about the meaning of equivalence between
nullification or impairment and the suspension of concessions, but it does not respond to
the essential problem of interpreting this language in context. The arbitrators found that
correspondence is the key meaning, without asking which value should “correspond,”
and without paying attention to the dictionary language regarding “equal in value” and
“having the same effect.” This language would lead to an examination of the effects of
trade barriers and the reasons for valuing free trade in accordance with WTO
commitments. However, without discussion, the arbitrators assumed that the U.S. level
of suspension is “clear”,70 implicitly assuming that equivalence is to be determined in
terms of the magnitude of the barriers, not in terms of the value of the barriers.
One approach that the arbitrators did not use is to refer to the general international
law meaning of the coordinate concept, as reflected in the Rules of State Responsibility.
Art. 36 of the Rules provides for compensation, stating that “The compensation shall
cover any financially assessable damage including loss of profits insofar as it is
established.” Although it may be argued that the reference to “equivalence” in Article
22.4 is different from “compensation,” there is no reason to think that by use of the term
“equivalent” the member states intended to provide for something more or less than
“compensation.” Rather, compensation might well be understood to entail equivalence.
In this sense, Article 22.4 might be understood simply to invoke, with a different word,
the customary international law concept of compensation reflected in the Rules. Recall
also that the parties are intended to negotiate “compensation” under Article 22.2 of the
68
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DSU. It would seem likely that the drafters of the DSU expected that each side would
negotiate “compensation” under Article 22.2 under the shadow of “equivalence” under
Article 22.4. Thus, it would be unrealistic to expect different measures, and it is not
unreasonable to use the customary international law meaning of “compensation” to
inform our understanding of “equivalence.”
The arbitratorsin EC -Bananas III (U.S.) used the prospective gross value of lost
exports from the U.S. to the EU as the measure of nullification or impairment.71 It
specifically declined to consider other losses, including U.S. losses due to loss of exports
to third countries.72 Furthermore, as Spamann points out, a focus on lost exports, instead
of affected exports, may artificially and significantly reduce the level of possible
retaliatory suspension of concessions.73 A focus on lost trade to the exclusion of affected
trade would tend to ignore substantial terms of trade effects.
EC-Bananas III (U.S.) has been followed by subsequent arbitrations in terms of
the focus (outside of export subsidy cases) on lost exports, rather than other possible
measures of damages.
In the Hormones case,74 the arbitrators also used a “but for” approach to
comparing the amount of exports that existed, and the amount of exports that would have
been made “but for” the EC’s measure. The arbitratorsfocused on trade flows. 75
Of course, Ecuador had significant problems in utilizing rights to retaliate against
the EC in Bananas.76 Here, the arbitrators specifically stated that they could not
determine equivalence beyond trade in goods and services under Articles 22.6 and 22.7.
Therefore, the arbitrators could not estimate the magnitude of non-compliance with
TRIPS.77 The arbitrators’ position seems inconsistent with their explicit mandate.
Furthermore, the arbitrators specifically noted that they did not consider lost profits as
part of their calculation.78 It is rumored that Ecuador was granted certain non-WTO
benefits in order informally to settle this case.
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In the 1916 Act case, the EC proposed mirror legislation in order to avoid the
difficulty of quantifying the effects of the U.S. prohibition on dumping.79 The arbitrators
rejected this qualitative approach, on the ground that it could result in a greater-thanequivalent quantity of retaliation. The arbitrators agreed that the quantity of nullification
or impairment would be equal to the amount of future judgments entered against, or
settlements accepted by, EC exporters under the U.S. law.80 The arbitrators did not
evaluate how a monetary sum representing the nullification or impairment by the U.S.
could be translated into the anticipated suspension of trade concessions in retaliation by
the EC. The arbitrators seemed to assume a “dollar-for-dollar” correspondence.
However, from the EC standpoint, one would imagine that it would rather have a dollar
than the right to block a dollar’s worth of trade.
In a case outside of Article 22.6, the U.S.—Copyright case,81 monetary
compensation was granted. This arbitration took place under Article 25 of the DSU, but
the mandate to the arbitrators was to determine the level of nullification or impairment of
benefits to the EC. In the special case of TRIPS, where the claim related to a failure to
protect intellectual property rights that give rise to royalty payments, there was little
alternative but to resort to monetary compensation of approximately $1 million per year.
4. Building the WTO Cathedral: Property Rules, Liability Rules, Efficient Breach
and Auctions
Economic analysis of law has enhanced our understanding of contract and tort, as
well as other areas of law, by focusing analysis on incentives and consequences. We thus
return to the question, raised above, of whether WTO law operates as a property rule or
as a liability rule.82 It will be recalled that in 1972, Guido Calabresi and Douglas
Melamed suggested that while property rules might promote efficient exchange under
low transaction costs, liability rules promote efficient exchange under high transaction
costs.83 As we examine remedies in the WTO, it is useful to draw on this literature in
order to understand the incentive effects of various possible approaches to remedies.
a. Interpreting and Applying WTO Law
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Before we develop a normative analysis, however, it is useful to examine the
debate over the existing doctrinal requirements. Here, we must carefully distinguish
between the law as legislated and the law in action.
John Jackson,84 Jide Nzelibe85 and others argue that the correct reading of WTO
law is that something approximating a property rule applies, rather than a liability rule.
That is, according to their interpretation, WTO law is mandatory law and states are not
permitted to violate even if they accept the consequences of suspension of concessions.
Although not free from doubt,86 this is probably the better interpretation of existing WTO
law.
However, this position requires us to begin to distinguish between authority and
power. Even if we assume that this interpretation is correct, a legal realist, and a legal
economist, would ask not what the formal law specifies, but what it does in response to
breach. Ubi ius ibi remedium. Here, the law in action clearly does not operate as a
property rule.
States violate WTO law, and they are not subject to enforceable specific
performance-type remedies, nor do they experience any greater penalty for their
violation, outside of the SCM Agreement context. So, as a matter of fact and practice, if
not as a matter of legal doctrine, the WTO legal system is best characterized as
employing a liability rule, rather than a property rule. In fact, the Director-General of the
WTO, Pascal Lamy, has stated that “[a]s long as you pay the penalties, you can go on as
you are.”87 A former director of the WTO Legal Affairs Division, Pieter Jan Kuyper, has
suggested that “we should go in the direction of accepting compensation and suspension
of concessions as full alternatives to compliance. . . .”88
Doctrinally, WTO arbitration panels have rejected the concept of punitive
damages.89 They have also rejected the possibility of damages that exceed the value of
the violation in order to compel compliance, except, as discussed above, in connection
with export subsidies under a curious interpretation of the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures. It should be noted, however, that outside of the SCM
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Agreement, there is no question of authorizing suspension of concessions greater than a
level equivalent to the nullification or impairment.90 Thus, doctrinally, it appears that
there is no general property rule at WTO law.
In addition, as discussed above, while the Rules of State Responsibility generally
require restitution, which would be consistent with a property rule, they also provide no
basis for punitive damages or the enforcement of specific performance through
compelling remedies. While the International Court of Justice in the Chorzow Factory
case suggested the remedy of restitution,91 this remedy has not been common in the
international investment context or in the broader international law context. Rather, a
rule of damages—of liability—is common in practice.
b. Property Rules and Liability Rules
In the domestic system, we distinguish between property rules and liability rules
on the basis that liability rules are subject to the unilateral choice of an actor to violate the
rule and incur the liability. The owner of the entitlement that is protected by a liability
rule cannot object to the action, but must accept the payment of damages. Liability rules
require, in order to operate, that courts are available to determine the value of the
damages. They are therefore dependent on an appropriate institutional structure.
Property rules, on the other hand, protect the entitlement unless the owner consents to its
taking. We often assume (perhaps incorrectly) that property rules are backed by
injunctive or specific performance remedies.
From a neoclassical economics standpoint, some might assume that in the WTO
context, a property rule, supported by specific performance or by enormous punitive
damages, would yield greatest efficiency. After all, there is no proposition more
commonly accepted in economics than the fundamental theorem of welfare economics,
which in our context argues that reduction of barriers to trade increases welfare. Yet we
must challenge an implicit assumption of this perspective. The implicit assumption is
that compliance with WTO law maximizes welfare. This assumption might generally be
true of tariff reduction and quota elimination obligations.92 But WTO law today includes
a wide variety of obligations, some of which are quite ambivalent from a welfare
standpoint. One need only consider the requirements of the TRIPS agreement, or the
restrictions on domestic regulation under the SPS and TBT Agreements. As suggested
above, we should begin to discriminate among these various obligations.
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Now, there is a difference between (i) automatic and compelling specific
performance—a requirement that parties comply without any opportunity for
renegotiation—and (ii) specific performance as a bargaining chip. Many international
lawyers see WTO law as absolute in its requirement for compliance, without the
possibility for renegotiation. We might understand this as a rule of inalienable property
rights. This would be broadly inefficient, as it would deny the possibility of efficient
breach in appropriate cases. However, the possibility of specific performance as a
bargaining chip is not necessarily inefficient. Rather, it gives rise to the requirement to
negotiate with the holder of the entitlement.
The WTO Agreement has been compared to a contract.93 If the WTO “contract”
reflected efficiency—if it were a complete contract—then the prescription would be
clear: compel performance through a remedy of specific performance. The WTO
contract, however, is not by any means complete. The dispute settlement system,
including its remedies, may be understood as a means of providing further articulation of
the contract.
On the other hand, as suggested above, some components of the WTO contract
may be understood as complete, such as the tariff bindings and the prohibition on de jure
discrimination and de jure quotas (where a colorable argument for exception exists, the
contract becomes incomplete). Under these circumstances, it may well be that specific
performance is the correct remedy.
Under incompleteness, however, it is not clear that specific performance is the
efficient remedy.94 In fact, the parties to the WTO agreement did not indicate specific
performance as the remedy, but rather established the possibility for compensation and
countermeasures and failed explicitly to require compliance.95 Furthermore, there are
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specific provisions for “escape” and renegotiation in specific areas: for example, the
safeguards provisions of Article XIX of GATT and the renegotiation provisions of
Article XXVIII.
Under circumstances where specific performance is unavailable, or where there
are no additional penalties for non-compliance beyond equivalent compensation, there is
little difference between a liability regime and a property regime. That is, in a world
without specific performance or punitive damages, the liability rule applies as a matter of
law in action. On the other hand, the debate over whether states have the authority or
power to “buy out” their WTO obligations is a struggle over reputational sanctions. If it
is understood that “international obligation” applies regardless of the authorization of
retaliation or the provision of compensation, then states that follow this route will incur
reputational costs.
In the WTO context, a liability rule would mean that a state may violate WTO
law, so long as it pays the damages, or accepts the suspension of concessions. In the
domestic system, we often assume that a property right is absolute: if property is taken
from us without our consent, a court will order that it be given back. Of course, the
actual remedies in domestic law may be somewhat less clear than the theory supposes.
The procedural requirement for specific performance or an injunction is a demonstration
that damages are inadequate to right the wrong.96 So not every property right will have
the characteristics anticipated by theory.
As Schwartz and Sykes point out, the normative goal of any system of contract
remedies is to deter inefficient breaches—those that impose greater costs on the
promissee than benefits on the promisor—and to promote efficient breaches—those that
impose lower costs on the promissee than benefits on the promisor.97 Note that this
formulation is unconcerned with distributive consequences. In the area of remedies for
antitrust law violation, a similar concept is often discussed in terms of “type 1 error”
(false negative) and “type 2 error” (false positive). Type 1 error fails to induce efficient
compliance. Type 2 error induces inefficient compliance.98
Schwartz and Sykes refer to contracts theory which suggests that under
circumstances where liability would be difficult to measure, a property rule would be
favored.99 They argue that because a property rule would require negotiations with each
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WTO member state (148 as of August 26, 2005) under the MFN principle, the transaction
costs and holdout problems would be excessive.
However, the MFN principle would not necessarily operate in this context to
require universal member consent to a bilateral settlement that required worse treatment
of the respondent’s goods, as opposed to better treatment of the complainant’s. Say that
the EC is found to have violated U.S. rights under the SPS Agreement in connection with
GMOs. And say that it is understood as an entitlement under the conventional
understanding of the requirements for compliance under the DSU
: the U.S. has the right
to force the EC to comply. The normal WTO remedy would be for the U.S. to impose
barriers only on goods from the EC, under Article 3.7 of the DSU. If the parties
negotiated a specified level of U.S. import barriers, applicable only to EC goods, it is not
clear that the EC would be required to negotiate with other states. Article I of GATT
requires that any “advantage, favour, privilege or immunity” be accorded to like products
imported any other contracting party. Thus, although it is not free from doubt, MFN
might well be understood to allow states to be accorded less favorable treatment with
their consent—other states would not be required to consent.100 On the other hand, if the
“compensation” in our hypothetical took the form of special market opening by the EC, it
is not clear that the EC would be required to negotiate with every other state—it would
just be required under Article I to accord the same treatment. This feature would
certainly make compensation unappealing in many cases.
Even if as a technical legal matter bilateral or plurilateral settlement agreements
were to violate WTO law, it is not clear that other states would intervene, or experience
any nullification or impairment. This may depend on the extent of trade deflection.
In any event, there may be problems associated with bilateral monopoly (as
opposed to holdouts resulting from the requirement to negotiate with all WTO members)
that make it difficult to reach efficient solutions under a property rule.101
On the other hand, while the public choice-based damages on which Schwartz and
Sykes focus may be especially difficult to calculate, it is not clear that public interestbased damages would be more difficult to calculate than certain types of contract or
antitrust damages. We return to this point below.
Schwartz and Sykes conclude that the modifications to WTO dispute settlement
that were made in the Uruguay Round were intended to provide for a liability rule, and to
set limits on retaliation. Limits on retaliation would reduce the possibility for inefficient
compliance. Schwartz and Sykes argue that three forces induce compliance separately
from multilaterally-authorized suspension of concessions. These forces are (i) rising
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domestic costs of violations, especially after initial liberalization, (ii) reputation, and (iii)
unilateral retaliation.
Schwartz and Sykes seem to suggest that these forces were in place before 1994,
and that they persist after 1994 in order to induce compliance. Thus, they believe that
multilateral authorization of remedies was not necessary to add to the forces that induce
compliance. Rather, they suggest that the modifications in 1995 to make multilaterallyauthorized suspension of concessions a more likely result were intended to limit
retaliation, not to increase it. According to Schwartz and Sykes, the innovation of the
DSU was to provide “the opportunity for the losing disputant to ‘buy out’ of the violation
at a price set by an arbitrator who has examined carefully the question of what sanctions
are substantially equivalent to the harm done by the violation.”102 The result is to protect
the respondent from excessive retaliation, and increases opportunities for efficient breach.
However, there is no basis to believe that the magnitude of retaliation set by the
arbitrators is correctly calibrated to induce efficient breach and efficient compliance.103
c. The Conditions for Efficient Breach under a Liability Rule
Schwartz and Sykes explore the possibility that the existing WTO system of
remedies is consistent with the law and economics theory of contracts that suggests the
possibility of efficient breach.104 Their approach does not follow a welfare economics
approach to efficient breach, but instead uses a public choice lens to evaluate the
efficiency of breach in terms of the utility functions of political operatives. They argue
doctrinally that the WTO system is, and normatively that it should be, more like a
liability rule than a property rule. That is, the liability rule would induce states to comply
when it is “efficient” (in public choice, as opposed to welfare, terms) to do so, and to
breach when that is “efficient.” Schwartz and Sykes suggest that the theory of efficient
breach is equally applicable in the context of trade agreements, despite the inability to
monetize costs and benefits.105
In fact, in standard law and economics theory, under incompleteness, an
expectation measure of damages is understood to lead to efficient decisions by a promisor
to perform or breach an existing contract, given a fixed level of reliance.106 Perfect
expectation damages would make the obligee indifferent between performance and
102
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breach.107 “Perfect expectation damages equal the gain that the promisee who relied
optimally would have obtained from performance.”108
However, there are some important conditions that must be satisfied in order for
efficient breach to operate. Efficient breach under a liability rule109 depends on the
ability of a third party, such as a court, to determine a level of damages that will
approximate the level of liability that will best distinguish between efficient and
inefficient breach.110 Thus, in contract theory, efficient breach is dependent on
calculation of the objective value of expectations of the non-breaching party. Similarly,
in trade, efficient breach is dependent on calculation of the objective value of
expectations of the non-breaching state.
It is critical that Schwartz and Sykes’ theory operates in the world of public
choice, where the values exchanged and disputed are political welfare of political
officials, rather than necessarily economic welfare of constituents. These values are
calculated in votes, campaign contributions or graft. Thus, there is no court that can
determine “damages” in political welfare terms. Schwartz and Sykes accept this,111 but
this distinction limits the scope of utility of the efficient breach concept. That is, we may
presume efficient breach, but because we have no way of identifying the actual value of
breach, as we do in private contracts, we cannot determine whether any particular breach
is or is not efficient. This limits substantially the ability of society to realize the benefits
of efficient breach.
Using a public choice-based measure of damages in trade law would be
equivalent to using a measure of damages in inter-corporate litigation that reflected the
concerns of management, rather than the welfare-based lost profits or expectation
damages that are actually used.
In short, liability rules rely on quantification to operate. How can actors
determine whether their breach is indeed efficient without a possibility of quantification
so that they may compare the benefits of breach with the resultant liability? If the
resultant liability is relatively inaccurate or unreliable, parties may make inefficient
decisions. Of course, under zero transaction costs, parties will presumably negotiate to
an efficient outcome regardless of the liability for breach. But our working assumption is
that positive transaction costs make the actual rule of liability meaningful for efficiency.
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d. The Limits of Auctions, Contingent Liberalization Commitments and
Fines
An auction of the right to retaliate, as suggested by Bagwell, Mavroides and
Staiger,112 and by the Government of Mexico,113 may solve important problems,
including the problem that developing countries may find the right to retaliate less useful
than do developed countries. However, the value of the right to retaliate is not
necessarily related to the welfare value of the violation. The incentive effects of an
auction of a (miscalculated) right to retaliate could be perverse. So if the amount of the
retaliation right that is auctioned is calculated separately from welfare effects, there can
be no guarantee that an auction will enhance efficiency. Where the level of suspension of
concessions is calculated by reference to welfare, an auction of the right to retaliate may
substitute for direct payment of cash, and may therefore solve some problems of
enforcement. However, it would leave in place the possibility of welfare-reducing
retaliation unless the respondent wins the auction, retiring the right to retaliate unused.
Using a general-equilibrium model, Bagwell and Staiger show that the balance of
concessions is restored when a retaliatory action is large enough to restore the offending
country’s original terms of trade (i.e., the ratio of the price of its export good to its import
good on world markets). They consider the possibility that the harmed country may hold
an auction for retaliation of this size.114 Their model equates this magnitude of retaliation
with welfare.
In 2000, the Meltzer Commission (2000) proposed that "instead of retaliation,
countries guilty of illegal trade practices should pay an annual fine equal to the value of
the damages assessed by the panel or provide equivalent trade liberalization."115
Bronckers and van den Broek also propose a fine, as opposed to a welfarist calculation of
monetary compensation.116 These approaches to monetary fines, while addressing the
problem of capacity to retaliate and avoiding welfare-reducing trade barriers in
retaliation, suffer from the same problem as auctions and contingent liberalization
commitments. The amounts charged will not be related to the value of the violation.
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Of course it is possible that specification of liquidated damages, whether in terms
of contingent liberalization commitments117 or cash amounts, may have substantial
advantages under certain circumstances. However, these advantages would apply mostly
to relatively discrete contracts with limited subject matters. It may be difficult for trade
negotiators to pre-value appropriately all of the different types of breach that might occur.
Again, the nature of international trade “contracts” entails substantial incompleteness.
5. Is a Welfare-Based Remedy Possible in Existing WTO Law?
During the pre-1994 GATT period, retaliation was authorized just once,118 and in
that case the Netherlands determined not to exercise the right to retaliate against the U.S.
Moreover, until 1995, panel decisions were not adopted without consensus and
authorization to suspend concessions was not granted without consensus. This meant that
the respondent state could block any formal sanctions. So, there was little reason to
scrutinize the calculation of authorized retaliation. Today, it appears desirable to
examine the structure of remedies to determine whether it may be made more efficient.
a. Retrospective or Prospective Calculation
It seems clear that in order to equate retaliation with a welfare-based calculation
of damage, it would be necessary to calculate damage on both a retrospective and
prospective basis. Thus, first of all, a state that violates WTO law should be required to
make a payment even if it ceases its violation after a DSB decision,119 or after the expiry
of the “reasonable period of time” given for compliance. This is necessary in order to
make WTO law incentive-compatible, and in order to compensate complainant states for
their losses. In fact, unless it were shown that the present trade volume-based approach
systematically overstated retaliation, or some other reason were shown to give offending
states a “free ride” until adjudication and expiry of time for compliance, this modification
should be made in the present system. As stated above, nothing in the text of the DSU
limits retaliation to calculation based on prospective nullification or impairment. Indeed,
it seems patently counter-textual to apply this limit.120
b. Bilateral or Global Injury
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It seems likely that in order to make WTO law enforcement incentive compatible,
it would be appealing to require violating states to pay damages in relation to the injury
caused to all member states, and not just those who join in litigation. A change in the last
sentence of Article 22.2 of the DSU would be necessary to achieve this outcome. If this
change were made, it might make it more likely that states would negotiate voluntary
compensation pursuant to Article 22.2.
c. Calculating Welfare
We show above that while a welfare-based approach might compete with a public
choice-based approach, there is no assurance that the present system of calculating
retaliation based on trade volumes is superior to a welfare-based calculation under a
public choice model. Obviously, Article 22.4 limits authorized retaliation to “suspension
of concessions or other obligations,” and so cash remedies would only be possible with
an amendment to this provision.
Anderson shows that “ensuring equivalence between the damage and the
retaliation in terms of the gross value of trade between the respondent and the
complainant does not mean that retaliation has the same economic welfare effect on the
respondent as the initial damage is having on the complainant.”121 Furthermore,
retaliation is not costless to the complainant.122 Anderson concludes that
The economic purist might wonder why the value of imports curtailed, rather than
a valuation of the national economic welfare consequences of the import barriers,
is used to determine equivalence in retaliation to nullification or impairment. The
reason probably has much less to do with an understanding of economics than
with the relative simplicity of the traditional concept of trade equivalence.123
Lawrence agrees that “the dollar value of trade may give little guidance as to the
welfare benefits and opportunity cost associated with any particular transaction.”124
Lawrence points out that as applied, the DSU does not provide complainants with what
would amount to “expectation damages.”
Rebalancing trade volumes leads to equivalence only in a mercantilist sense of
allowing the plaintiff to eliminate the “bad” of imports. If politicians are
concerned only about the trade balance, they may feel compensated, but in terms
of economic welfare, only (external) harm done to the plaintiff country due to the
decline in its terms of trade can be taken care of by suspension. If it retaliates, the
plaintiff country will not be compensated for the (internal) efficiency losses that
will result from its higher tariffs. Instead of being in the position it would have
121
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been had the agreement been implemented, the plaintiff will find itself in the
position it was before the negotiation that resulted in the agreement.125
[check this] Bernstein and Skully set out the difference between a welfare-based
calculation of damages and a volume of trade-based calculation.126 They note that both
calculations rely on counterfactuals: compare the world with the illegal policy to the
counterfactual world without the policy. The welfare-based calculation in connection
with an illegally raised tariff would proceed as follows. (Note that other types of
violation would require different, and often more complex, calculations.) The tariff
results in higher domestic prices, causing domestic firms to increase production, and
causing domestic consumers to reduce consumption. Import volumes are reduced.
Current analysis would focus simply on the reduced import volumes.
A welfare-based calculation, on the other hand, would examine transfers between
sectors and dead-weight welfarelosses. An illegal tariff reduces welfare of domestic
consumers, through a transfer from consumers to domestic producers. The tariff itself
represents a transfer from consumers to the government of the importing state. Domestic
producers benefit from higher prices. And there is a net welfare loss. Bernstein and
Skully show that, except for the net welfare loss, all other effects are transfers between
domestic agents in the importing state, and from a national welfare perspective, they net
out. However, it is important to note that Bernstein and Skully’s model is based on a
small country, where there are no terms of trade effects. Furthermore, it may not be clear
that it is appropriate to net transfers between domestic agents. From a public choice
standpoint, benefits to domestic producers play a greater role than detriments to domestic
consumers. And so, it might be argued that the government imposing trade barriers
should not “benefit” in this sense from detriments it imposes on its own consumers. Or it
might be argued that trade law should reverse the public choice bias by redistributing
these benefits from domestic producers to domestic consumers. This suggests an
argument that, in order to establish appropriate incentives for domestic governments,
these governments should implement private rights of action that allow domestic
consumers to recover amounts transferred to domestic producers.
Bernstein and Skully posit that “[e]conomists are concerned about efficiency,
while arbitrators are concerned about dispute resolution and distributional justice.”127
However, WTO arbitrators are mandated simply to examine the equivalent level of
nullification or impairment. As suggested above, this language does not exclude a
welfare-based measure, although there may be an interpretative argument, based on prior
GATT practice, that the language was intended to refer to trade volumes. Even this
interpretative argument raises substantial questions, as many types of WTO law do not
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deal with trade volumes at all.128 Bernstein and Skully are concerned that the amount of
dead-weight loss will not be sufficient to deter violation, and it is on this basis that they
explain the turn to trade volume- based remedies. Their argument is that importing
governments seek public choice welfare, and respond to incentives that loom larger than
the requirement to compensate for the dead-weight loss.129 However, this position seems
unconcerned with the possibility of efficient breach.
Bernstein and Skully argue for penalties above the level of welfare loss in order to
deter non-compliance. They find that lost trade as a measure is simple and
straightforward and “does a reasonable job of approximating the amount of impairment
caused by the ban [in the Hormones case].130” However, they offer no empirical support
for the proposition that the lost trade measure reasonably approximates impairment. One
might respond that, even in public choice terms, a specified volume of trade may have
widely varying effects on profitability or jobs, and thus on political support.
Furthermore, as Mitchell, and Kovelock and Thursby, show, broader
“international obligation” or reputation may induce compliance where formal remedies
are otherwise insufficient.131 Hudec adds that legal rulings by themselves induce
compliance by (i) empowering domestic constituencies who prefer the WTO-compliant
policy, and (ii) bringing to bear longer-term interests in the efficacy of the legal
system.132 Thus, legal rulings can be expected to have an effect that is separate from, and
supplemental to, any formal remedy. Under GATT 1947, retaliation was almost never
employed, yet compliance with panel decisions was rather good. The point is not that the
magnitude of the formal sanctions is irrelevant to compliance, especially under the more
formal WTO system, but that it is only one factor in determining compliance.
d. A Competition Law Analogy
Competition law responds to private actions that foreclose markets, and so there is
at least some basis for considering an analogy between competition law remedies for
private measures that foreclose markets133 and remedies for violations of WTO law that
result in market foreclosure. Obviously, not all WTO law violations result in market
foreclosure. There are many additional distinctions, some of which we address below.
Keith Hylton writes that
Under the assumption that enforcement is costless and that the government will
identify and punish all antitrust violators with probability one, the consumer
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welfare-maximizing fine is easy to state: the optimal fine equals the sum of the
portion of deadweight loss borne by consumers and the monopoly transfer.134
However, there is no consensus that existing competition law remedies, including
treble damages in the U.S., approximate optimal penalties. Where enforcement is costly
and uncertain, the optimal fine (the distinction between a fine and a “liability” need not
concern us here) adds the cost of enforcement, and multiplies the total by the inverse of
the probability of enforcement.135 The equation is as follows:
Optimal fine = 1/p (transfer plus consumer deadweight loss) + C
Where p is the probability of enforcement and C is the cost of enforcement.
e. Problems of Calculation
Of course, any welfare-based calculation will be difficult, and subject to many
uncertainties. Lawrence states that [i]n principle, assuming the product is produced
competitively, this calculation requires a complex econometric model that embodies
estimates of supply and demand elasticities to provide the answer.”136 Hylton suggests
that “[m]any large antitrust cases now involve experts trained in econometrics who could
provide reliable estimates of the transfer and foregone consumer surplus components.”137
These components would be analogous to those arising from violations of WTO law that
result in market foreclosure.
Basically, the calculation would value the stream of income in a hypothetical
world without the violation, and subtract the actual stream of income: a “but for”
calculation. In the competition law context, the following principles would be applied to
estimate damages:138
i. Future damages may be measured as the net present value of
expected cash flows in the “but for” world that would have existed
but for the violation, minus the net present value of expected cash
flows in the “actual” world after the violation. The net present
value of expected cash flows will be equal to the present value of
the cash flows generated by an investment minus the amount of the
investment.
ii. Future expected cash flows should be discounted at the appropriate
risk- adjusted opportunity cost of capital.
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iii. Opportunity costs (possible mitigation) must be accounted for.
iv. Risks of future uncertainty should be accounted for by examining
the full range of alternative scenarios.
v. Large damage estimates usually arise from either market.
imperfections or economic rents or the presence of sunk costs.
f. Probability of Enforcement
How is the probability of enforcement to be calculated? In order to provide
appropriate incentives to each person, it might be suggested that the probability of
enforcement should be calculated separately for each type of case and for each person.139
Thus, it is more likely that enforcement would be effected against the U.S. in a case of
tariffs that exceed its bindings with no defense, than against Mozambique in a case of de
facto discrimination where there is a plausible health-based defense. Under these
circumstances, it might be argued, the probability multiplier should be higher for
Mozambique than for the U.S. for two reasons. First, because Mozambique is less likely
to attract enforcement attention. Second, because due to the uncertainty of victory,
litigation is less likely. Yet this seems like a perverse approach that would result in
greater remedies against states with the least power to consume, as well as greater
remedies in cases where WTO law is most uncertain.
On the other hand, as developing countries are less likely to bring cases, it may be
appropriate to use a higher multiplier in cases brought by developing countries in order to
reflect those cases that are not brought, or the developing countries that fail to join in
relevant cases.
An alternative approach is to utilize average probabilities of enforcement. This
would result in states with higher probabilities of enforcement being subjected to higher
multipliers than if their individual probabilities were considered. However, it is likely
that the states subject to higher probabilities of enforcement would be larger economies
than those subject to lower probabilities.140 Therefore, the use of average probabilities
may not be politically attractive.
g. Collective Sanctions and Class Actions
Developing countries, and especially those with smaller economies, have two
problems. First, WTO remedies do not seem to be designed to be useful to them.
Second, even if WTO remedies were redesigned as suggested in this article to be more
useful to developing countries, there are still significant barriers to their utility. These
barriers include the cost of litigation. Costs of litigation can be reduced by arrangements
by which smaller economies arrange to work together, sharing costs.
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More importantly, however, in order for remedies to have a full incentive effect
on the behavior of potential violators of WTO law, it is necessary that all injured states
receive the relevant compensation.141 If the likelihood is that only a subset of these states
will be compensated, potential violators will not be deterred.
h. Police Patrols and Fire Alarms, Public Attorneys General, Public “Private”
Attorneys General, and Private Private Attorneys General
[to be provided]
6.

Cash Remedies and Enforcement

Financial compensation has been proposed by several governments in connection
with Doha round negotiations.142 Once we calculate damages in welfare terms, it is an
easy and all but inevitable step to move to payment of financial compensation. As
Bronckers and Broek have pointed out, financial compensation “is not a novel idea:
reparation by governments of injury for which they can be held responsible is part of the
tradition of public international law.”143 Indeed, financial compensation seems to be the
preferred remedy in general international law. It has been most widely used in arbitral
awards in connection with the impairment of investments.
The greatest problems with cash remedies relate to enforcement. Whereas trade
retaliation entails “self-help,” payment of cash requires action by the respondent.
However, we have some experience with requirements of cash payments by states. As
noted above, the U.S.-Copyright case was formally settled using cash payments. The
Bananas case may have been settled informally between Ecuador and the EC through
cash consideration. And we have some experience from outside trade law, as well as
some new initiatives within the trade context.
a. Use of Cash Remedies in Investment Agreements
In connection with investment agreements, the presumptive remedy for violation
of investor rights is calculation of a cash payment. For example, Article 1135 of NAFTA
provides for final awards in investor-state arbitration requiring only either the payment of
monetary damages or restitution. In cases where restitution is ordered, the award is
required to provide that the state involved may pay monetary damages in lieu of
restitution. So, we have some experience with state obligations to pay monetary
damages. Monetary damages may be subject to dispute, and states may be recalcitrant in
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paying, but this has not deterred the implementation of monetary remedies in the
investment context.144 Of course, investment agreements generally provide for awards
that specify payment from states to private parties, but there is no reason to believe that
complainant states would have a greater problem collecting than private parties. As
investment agreements address public policy issues with greater frequency, and as trade
agreements are increasingly understood as affecting private persons, we may observe
increasing convergence.
b. Use of Cash Remedies in Trade Agreements
Under the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation,145 states
may complain about persistent failures by other member states to enforce their
environmental laws. These complaints may be submitted to arbitration and the panel may
impose a “monetary enforcement assessment.” While this facility has not been used to
reach this stage, where a party fails to pay a monetary enforcement assessment, the
complaining party may suspend the application of NAFTA benefits in an amount
sufficient to collect the monetary enforcement assessment.146 Thus, trade-based sanctions
may be used to enforce monetary sanctions. Such a structure could be considered in a
restructured WTO system of remedies. Similar provisions are provided in the North
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation. Other U.S. FTAs, notably that with
Chile,147 incorporate similar facilities.
In addition, the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement also permits monetary
assessments to be substituted for retaliation in normal trade barrier cases, pursuant to
Article 22.15. If the parties are unable to agree on an amount, the amount of monetary
assessment is set at 50% of the level of nullification or impairment determined by the
panel. Article 20.5 of the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement and Article 21.11 of the
U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement make similar provision. The fact that these
provisions calculate cash payments as a percentage of the trade effects (presumably
intended by “nullification or impairment”) suggests how difficult negotiators may find it
to develop a welfare-based formula. All these provisions have a retaliatory “back-up” if
states decline to pay monetary compensation.
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c. Public Choice Problems with Cash Remedies
Nzelibe argues that the problem with a move away from the current system to
cash remedies is that cash remedies would be paid by the violating state from general
funds, and therefore would not provide incentives for compliance.148 This is a public
choice-based analytical insight that assumes that the state’s actions are a kind of
aggregate of interest group pressures, and further assumes that dispersed interest groups,
like taxpayers, are unable to affect policy. However, these assumptions may not
accurately portray the qualities of representative government in particular cases. Nzelibe
also sees converse benefits in a rule of specific performance backed up by market-closing
retaliation that can be used to enlist domestic export interests in the violating state to
lobby for compliance.149
Nzelibe’s argument relates to the allocation of penalties within the violating state,
rather than to the quantification of penalties. However, it is not impossible that cash
remedies could be imposed directly on the industry within the violating state that is
benefited by the violation. This would have the triple advantages of (i) accurate
quantification, (ii) avoidance of a second market distortion, and (iii) fairness, as it would
not impose the punishment randomly on violating state export interests.
So, recognizing the value of Nzelibe’s insights, they do not necessarily argue
against cash remedies. Rather, they argue in favor of a particular distribution of cash
remedies to remove the incentives of import competing industries to seek protection. A
decision to impose the cash remedies on the domestic beneficiary industry would be even
better targeted in public choice terms than trade-blocking retaliation against an innocent
bystander export industry in the same state. Interestingly, in the domestic antitrust
context, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine would immunize industries that lobby
government for action that violates antitrust laws.
[this is an argument for PRAs for domestic consumers paying too high a price, and for
foreign producers to recover the transfer; in competition law, do we let the claimant
producer recover the lost consumer surplus?]
7. Conclusion
As suggested above, it appears that an efficient approach to remedies at the WTO
would distinguish among different types of rules. For rules that are amenable to a
“damages” remedy, the following calculation would appear to be an appropriate starting
point for discussion.
1
p

cmt + e = md
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cmt = the value of multilateral injury caused by the violation, calculated as the
amount of the transfer plus consumer deadweight loss, ex tunc (including both
retrospective and prospective components), plus interest from the date of injury
p = the probability of enforcement
e = cost of enforcement
md = measure of damages
As suggested above, the role of reputation is somewhat problematic, as it might
induce inefficient compliance under full formal penalties. From a political standpoint, a
damages multiplier to reflect the probability of enforcement may also be problematic, and
may be unnecessary under full formal penalties. Full formal penalties might provide
sufficient incentives for litigation to make the probability of enforcement relatively high.
This paper has been intended to suggest the legal and policy options available in
order to reform the structure of remedies in WTO dispute settlement. While developed
states may not be willing to give up the privileged position they now hold by virtue of the
existing structure of remedies, negotiations may be advanced by demonstrating the extent
and irrationality of the privilege.
* * *

